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A key term in economics, the exact definition of what a market is remains hotly debated (cf. Rosenbaum 
2000). Markets, economists insist, are physical or virtual places where supply and demand meet to 
determine prices. Theory suggests that in more liquid markets deals are concluded that are more attractive to 
both the selling and the buying party than in less liquid markets. At the same time, as suggested by 
management scholars, especially for markets where complex goods are traded, a market also is a location 
where relevant knowledge coalesces. In a market where more relevant knowledge is available, better 
performing deals are concluded. For the purpose of our study, markets may best be defined as defined 
markets as “institutionalised exchanges, where a consensus over prices and other information may be 
established” (Hodgson 1999, p.269). We study a market in which complex goods are traded: firms 
themselves. This is the market for corporate control. More liquid markets are markets where more deals are 
concluded, thus markets with what in network theory is called a high degree centrality (Freeman 1978-9). 
Markets where much knowledge is available are markets with what in social network literature is called a 
high betweenness centrality (Freeman 1978-9). We use Thomson Reuter SDC data on mergers & 
acquisitions to determine which of these effects is biggest (cf. Fuller et al. 2002). The results we have 
suggest a richer understanding of the functioning of markets is needed. 
 
1. LITERATURE 
Markets are physical or virtual places in which parties voluntarily exchange specific goods. The exchange 
can and often does involve a general medium of exchange such as money, but need not do so. While the 
exchange can involve actions in the (distant) future, and thus need not be a quid pro quo, and an exchange 
can involve some degree of uncertainty about what is exactly exchanged, the parties should know to some 
degree what the exchange involves.  
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Classically, in economics, markets are said to function well in one of two circumstances.  
The textbook argument states that in markets that are liquid, supply and demand meet more readily. 
In liquid markets, markets in which more deals are done, specifications of what is offered for sale by sellers 
are more likely to be what potential buyers are looking to buy. Because of this, more and more diverse deals 
are done - diverse in terms of deal sizes, for instance. Because buyers are more likely to find what they are 
looking for, not having to settle for a less attractive good, they are willing to pay a higher price. Deals done 
in textbook economics 101 type markets are likely to be better deals. 
The Austrian economics argument about well-functioning markets draws on Friedrich Hayek's 1945 
article about the role of knowledge on markets. Markets where more relevant knowledge is available about 
potential deals to be made, are markets where better deals are done. Hayek was involved in a discussion 
with the likes of (...) about the question if markets could be directed by government. Hayek claimed that 
they could not because there was more knowledge required to do so than a government could handle, that 
some of would necessarily be locally stuck, and that the market process <generated> knowledge 
instantaneously itself. Knowledge inheres in markets.  
Economic activities typically involve two, and possibly more, partners who voluntarily do a deal. 
Partners doing a deal can be seen as connected through the deal they strike. Partners are each based 
somewhere geographically, but a deal can be done between partners who are located in different locations. 
If they are, there can be said to be a connection between these locations. Locations can in that sense be seen 
as markets, a view certainly consistent with how economists originally conceptualise markets (Zuidhof 
2014). 
Markets in which more deals are struck, inside or with partners based outside of it, are more active 
or liquid markets. The economics 101 explanation of what makes markets function well would expect deals 
being done in such markets to do better than deals being done in less active or liquid. Assuming that indeed 
knowledge is generated in markets as deals are done, and that knowledge about markets, possible players in 
the market, and how to do deals best spread through market processes, knowledge about markets spreads as 
deals are done between players in different locations. Social network analysis (SNA) allows for an analysis 
about how knowledge spreads through a network of interconnected locations in which players are active 
(Freeman 1978-9; Aalbers & Dolfsma 2015).  From the perspective of SNA, partners doing deals from a 
particular location can be viewed in the aggregate as a node in a network connecting to partners in another 
location that in turn can be viewed in the aggregate as a node. Nodes for our purposes are markets where 
market players are based. Relations or ties between nodes are formed by the deals done between partners in 
a location (market).   
The Austrian view of markets can thus be operationalized by translating it in terms akin to those in 
Social Network Analysis. This view can then be said to predict that markets in which players are active that 
are centrally placed between other markets through the deals made in the overall market connecting all 
individual markets should be expected to do better than less well connected market nodes. This effect should 
be independent of the total size of the markets deals taking place in that market in total.  
 
Hyp.1: More liquid markets, i.e. markets in which more players conclude deals, show better deal  
 performance than less liquid markets. 
 
Hyp.2:  Markets in which more relevant knowledge is available show better deal performance than  
 markets in which less relevant knowledge is available. 
 
Market for corporate control. The market for corporate control is the market in which ownership in 
companies is traded. Trades done in this market are complex, highly dependent on regulation in place, 
keenly future oriented, and concluded by exceptionally highly knowledgeable players. In this knowledge-
intensive market, the types of deals concluded, if not the type of deals considered by players, are diverse. 
Knowledge thus appears to be an important ingredient for performance of deals done, but also the likelihood 
that supply and demand preferences and conditions are met with. The latter indicates that a deals done in a 
more liquid market should be expected to do well. 
The major form deals in the market for corporate control takes is that of Mergers & Acquisitions 
(M&As). In case such deals cross borders, this is referred to as Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), and 
constitutes a large part (..%) of this market closely watched by governments. At the height of activities in 
this market, which comes in waves (Mccarthy et al. 2016), some xxbn$ worth of deals are concluded.  
As a result of this, the market for corporate control is an important indicator of how markets in general can 
be assumed to function (cf Mccarthy & Dolfsma 2015). 
 
 
 
2. METHODS 
Data. We use Thomson SDC to build our sample of mergers and acquisitions. We refine this to include all 
deals between January 1, 1990 and December 31, 2012, which do not involve a recapitalization, repurchase 
of own shares, or a spin-off to existing shareholders. We only include deals for more than 10 million US$, 
announced by publicly listed acquirers, in which the location of both the target and the acquiring firms were 
reported. We exclude which involve the public authorities, such as the U.S. government, and all deals in 
which the acquirer and the target are part of the same group. Doing so, we create an initial sample of 35,709 
mergers and acquisitions. Figure 1 illustrates the geographic spread of the 35,709 acquiring firms in our 
sample.  
FIGURE 1 
 
Centrality. Centrality can be measured in a number of different ways (Opsahl et al., 2010). The simplest 
measure of centrality -- degree centrality -- considers the number of ties that each node in the network 
possesses, compared to the total size of the network. Degree centrality, therefore, is the classic centrality 
measure, as it simply counts the number of ties between nodes. Betweenness centrality, by contrast, is a 
measure of the number of times a node is included on the shortest path between other nodes in the network. 
Betweenness centrality, therefore, considers the degree to which a node is important in bridging nodes (e.g., 
Gilsing et al., 2008). We calculate both measures, given that both measures capture different elements of 
network centrality. 
Performance. We measure deal performance using a market-adjusted event study (Brown & Warner, 1980; 
1985; Fuller et al., 2002; Schoenberg, 2006; Papadakis and Thanos, 2010; Gregory et al., 2013). This 
technique is, today, the most commonly employed measure of acquisition performance in the strategic 
literature (King et al., 2004; Zollo and Miere, 2008; McNamara et al., 2008).  
An event-study is a tool used for assessing the way in which an event – such as an acquisition – causes a 
change in the value of a firm (Brown & Warner, 1980; 1985). In an event study, historical data is used to 
forecast ‘normal’ performance at a future date. Comparing this ‘forecast’ of how the firm should have 
performed -- in the absence of an event -- with ‘actual’ data on how the firm performed -- in the presence of 
the event -- provides an indicator of the firms ‘abnormal’ return; this is the change in value, above or below 
the firm’s expected value, attributable to the event. The sum of the acquirer’s abnormal returns (ARs) in a 
predefined period of time (the ‘event window’) is referred to as the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs).  
More specifically, we calculate the firms abnormal return of firm i;  
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =  𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝐸𝐸[𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡]     (1) 
Where Ri,t  is the actual return and E[Ri,t] is the estimated or normal return (Brown & Warner, 1980; 1985; 
MacKinlay, 1997; Duso et al. 2010). Normal returns are then calculated as: 
𝐸𝐸�𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� =  𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 𝐴𝐴𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡     (2) 
Where αi is the intercept coefficient, βi is the slope, Rm,t the formation of the used benchmarks, and εi,t is 
expected to be equal to 0 (MacKinlay, 1997). The abnormal returns in the event window are added, to create 
the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) to the firm as: 
𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖[𝑡𝑡1, 𝑡𝑡2] = ∑ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡2𝑡𝑡=𝑡𝑡1      (3) 
Strategic management studies often use accounting-based measures of acquisition performance, such as 
return on assets (e.g., Ramaswamy, 1997). Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are thought to be the more 
appropriate measure because: (1) the event study methodology (and, hence, cumulative abnormal returns) is 
the most frequently used analytical approach for measuring acquisition performance (e.g., Capron & Pistre, 
2002; King et al., 2004; Zollo & Miere, 2008; McNamara et al., 2008); (2) acquisition effects are not 
immediately reflected in the financial statements of an acquirer, because it often takes six months to three 
years before the acquirer realizes the effects (Rhoades, 1994), and during this period, many confounding 
factors, such as changes in product mix, investment strategy, and management, as well as execution of 
additional acquisitions, may affect firm performance; (3) accounting-based performance measures can be 
misleading because accounting procedures are not uniform across firms and industries (Bentson, 1985); and 
(4) research has shown that ex ante measures of acquirer abnormal returns are highly correlated with ex post 
measures of acquisition performance, demonstrating that event study methodology has predictive validity 
(Healy, et al, 1992).  
Following the practice in the literature, we compute abnormal returns to the shareholder of the acquiring 
firm using a number of different event windows (see Martynova and Renneboog, 2008 for a review). We 
calculate: a (+1,-1) CAR, from 1 trading day before the announcement to 1 day after (CAR1); a (+1,-2) 
CAR, from 2 trading days before the announcement to 1 day after (CAR2); a (+1,-5) CAR, from 5 trading 
days, or one week before the announcement to 1 day after (CAR5); and a (+1,-20) CAR, from 20 trading 
days, or four weeks, or one month, before the announcement to 1 day after (CAR1). It is standard practice to 
include the period prior to the announcement in the estimation to capture the effect of rumours and 
information leakages, which drive up the firms share price, in anticipation of future performance gains 
(Schwert, 1996). In order to remove the effect of outliers, we winzorised all CARs between 1 and 99%. Data 
limitations, at this point, reduces the sample of acquisitions for which we could calculate performance from 
35,709 to 19,273. We drop the remaining deals from our analysis.  
TABLE 1 
Controls. A number of acquirer-, target-, and deal-specific characteristics are known to impact the way in 
which the market responds to the announcement of a deal (see e.g., King et al., 2004).  
We control for: (1) the Percent Acquired, in terms of how much of the target the acquirer purchases, 
because deals for less than 100% often run into more difficulties in the integration phase; (2) acquirer’s 
Financial Slack – which we define as the acquirer’s operating cash flow, normalized by total assets over the 
last four quarters before the announcement – because Jensen (1986) suggests that financial slack predicts 
sub-par acquisition performance; (3) the Acquirers Prior Performance r – which we estimate as the 
acquirers return on assets the year before the acquisition – because research shows that prior performance 
predicts future performance (Morck et al., 1990); (4) Acquirer Market-to-Book Ratio – which is a ratio of 
the acquirers market value to its book value – because Rau and Vermaelen (1998) show that market-to-book 
ratios predict acquisition behaviour and performance; (5) Relatedness – which we identify using an indicator 
variable set equal to 1 if the target and acquirer share the same primary two-digit standard industrial 
classification (SIC) code – because research related acquisitions outperform unrelated acquisitions 
(Chatterjee, 1986); (6) Cross-border deals – which we identify with a dummy set equal to 1 if the target and 
the acquirer are from different countries – because the international business literature is premised upon the 
suggestion that international borders imply costs.  
The data to construct these variables was collected from Datastream. Table 1 reports the correlation and 
descriptive statistics for our key variables. We winsorized each of the control variables, between 0.05 and 
99.5%, to remove outliers. We test each of the controls for normality, using a Shapiro-Wilk test, and 
employed the logs of any variables (Acquirers Financial Slack, Acquirers Prior Performance,) which failed 
this test when entering these in our model.   
Estimation. We estimate the impact of centrality on performance using standard OLS regression 
techniques. We control, in all estimates, for unobserved effects by including: (1) year dummies; (2) industry 
dummies for the acquirers and targets industry, using each firm’s 2-digit SIC codes  
3. RESULTS 
We estimate 8 OLS regression models. Tables 2 and 3 report the results. Table 2 reports 4 OLS models in 
which the independent measure is betweenness centrally. The models differ in the dependents that they use: 
Models 1 uses the winsorized CAR of the firm in the (+1,-1) window (CAR1), Model 2 use the winsorized 
CAR of the firm in the (+1,-2) window (CAR2), and so on. All four models are consistent, and suggest that 
the betweenness centrality of the acquiring firms location has a negative and significant impact on deal 
performance.  
TABLE 2 
Table 3 reports this exercise, using degree centrality as the independent centrality measure. Again, the four 
models present a consistent story: Models 5-8 report that the degree centrality of the acquiring firm’s 
location has a negative and significant impact on deal performance.  
TABLE 3 
The relatively low r-squared in each case – between 3% and 9% -- is typical of event studies. For example: 
Moeller et al. (2005) use an event study, and OLS estimation, to investigate the performance of 6,596 
mergers and acquisitions, and report adjusted R-squares of 2.4-5.6%; Morck and Yeung (1992) use an event 
study, and OLS estimation to investigate the announcement of 322 internationalisations, and report R-
squares of 0-4.3%; Muller and Kräussl (2010) use an event study, and OLS estimation, to study the 
announcement of 354 corporate disaster donations, and reports adjusted R-squares of 4-6%; and McNamara 
and Baden-Fuller (2007) use an event study, and OLS estimation, to investigate the returns to R&D 
announcement by biotechnology firms, and report R-squares of 1-7%, using a sample of 180 firms. As our 
results fit within these window, we can be confident as to the goodness of fit of our model.  
4. CONCLUSIONS 
Markets are suggested to work well in economics if they are either (1) liquid in the sense of relatively many 
suppliers and buyers seeking to do deals, or (2) well stocked with knowledge. The first view is related to 
textbook economics, while the last is connected with the Austrian view of economics and in particular with 
Friedrich Hayek. Empirically, these views can be captured using social network analysis of deals done in the 
market for corporate control (M&As). As we explain at length in the method section, deals connecting 
locations where target or acquirer are based constitute networks; locations with a high degree centrality are 
liquid, and locations with a high betweenness centrality are locations where much knowledge is 
accumulated. Assuming that our assumption of the market for corporate control being a proper indicator of 
how markets function is a correct one, the results we are able to present are a cause for further consideration 
of how exactly markets actually work. We find that neither do well, contrary to expectations. 
Much more seems to be involved than liquidity in a market and players, generally being 
knowledgeable (cf. Hodgson 2015; Rosenbaum 2000). Our results are highly suggestive in this sense. What 
some qualitative research and suggestions by practitioners suggest is that it matters which players take on 
what position in the market, and also how they internally organise and are externally connected (REFS). 
How specific markets are institutionally organised and which players exactly have knowledge is likely to 
affect average deal performance more than high-level or aggregate characterisations about markets. Who 
has access, directly or indirectly, to what information can also be expected to make a difference.  
If and to what extent this is the case, is currently not a feasible topic for research because of a lack 
of quantitative data. In the short to medium term, qualitative, case study research can offer first-off insights 
to further substantiate and specify this suggestion. The role of consultancies advising and brokering deals is 
likely to be an important one.  
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Table 1 – The Geographic Spread of the Sample 
 
 
 Table 1 – Descriptive Statistics  
 
 
 
  Mean S.D. Min Max 1 2 -3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
                  
1 CAR1 0.01 0.06 -0.16 0.24 1.00            
                  
2 CAR2 0.01 0.14 -0.40 0.51 0.43 1.00           
      0.00            
3 CAR5 0.01 0.08 -0.22 0.31 0.68 0.60 1.00          
      0.00 0.00           
4 CAR20 0.01 0.14 -0.40 0.51 0.43 1.00 0.60 1.00         
      0.00 -1.00 0.00          
5 Degree Centrality 151.28 104.12 1.00 379.00 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 1.00        
      0.00 -0.09 0.00 -0.09         
6 Betweeness Centrality 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.04 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.86 1.00       
      0.00 -0.21 -0.01 -0.21 0.00        
7 Percent Acquired 97.20 9.44 51.00 100.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.05 -0.06 1.00      
      -0.65 -0.07 -0.06 -0.07 0.00 0.00       
8 Acquirers Financial Slack (Log) -2.90 0.99 -11.01 3.44 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.09 0.08 1.00     
      -0.62 -0.47 -0.77 -0.47 -0.90 0.00 0.00      
9 Acquirers Prior Performance (Log) 1.82 0.84 -4.61 6.06 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.09 0.08 0.81 1.00    
      -0.15 -0.03 -0.25 -0.03 -0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00     
10 Acquirers Market-to-Book Ratio 0.00 0.15 -3.33 19.15 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 1.00   
      -0.54 -0.32 -0.45 -0.32 -0.54 -0.56 -0.69 -0.24 -0.32    
11 Related Acquisition  0.35 0.48 0.00 1.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.03 -0.03 0.00 1.00  
      -0.62 -0.25 -0.11 -0.25 -0.20 0.00 -0.07 0.00 0.00 -0.95   
12 Cross Border Acquisition 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.09 0.01 -0.09 0.00 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 1.00 
      -0.35 -0.82 -0.85 -0.82 0.00 -0.26 0.00 -0.84 -0.06 -0.46 -0.10  
                  
  
 Table 2 – Betweenness Centrality and Performance  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES wCAR1 wCAR20 wCAR5 wCAR20 
     
Betweeness Centrality -0.10*** -0.17*** -0.11*** -0.17** 
 (-2.668) (-1.869) (-2.143) (-1.869) 
Percent Acquired 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.275) (1.067) (1.260) (1.067) 
Acquirers Financial Slack (Log) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (1.385) (0.281) (0.325) (0.281) 
Acquirers Prior Performance (Log) -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (-1.559) (-1.053) (-0.417) (-1.053) 
Acquirers Market-to-Book Ratio -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 
 (-0.667) (-1.406) (-1.001) (-1.406) 
Related Acquisition  0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
 (0.133) (0.774) (-0.204) (0.774) 
Cross Border Acquisition 0.00* 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (1.664) (0.395) (0.653) (0.395) 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Acquirer Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Target Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Constant -0.01 0.04 -0.00 0.04 
 (-0.695) (0.927) (-0.026) (0.927) 
     
Observations 13,661 13,661 13,661 13,661 
Adjusted R-squared 0.09 0.05 0.03 0.05 
F 2.145 1.640 1.438 1.640 
 
t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 3 – Degree Centrality and Performance  
 
 
 (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES wCAR1 wCAR20 wCAR5 wCAR20 
     
Degree Centrality -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00** 
 (-4.307) (-1.487) (-3.199) (-1.487) 
Percent Acquired 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.567) (1.227) (1.489) (1.227) 
Acquirers Financial Slack (Log) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (1.451) (0.320) (0.376) (0.320) 
Acquirers Prior Performance (Log) -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (-1.531) (-0.997) (-0.386) (-0.997) 
Acquirers Market-to-Book Ratio -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 
 (-0.679) (-1.404) (-1.008) (-1.404) 
Related Acquisition  0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
 (0.187) (0.818) (-0.159) (0.818) 
Cross Border Acquisition 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (1.332) (0.303) (0.413) (0.303) 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Acquirer Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Target Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Constant -0.01 0.04 -0.00 0.04 
 (-0.742) (0.886) (-0.065) (0.886) 
     
Observations 13,661 13,661 13,661 13,661 
Adjusted R-squared 0.09 0.05 0.04 0.05 
F 2.257 1.628 1.493 1.628 
 
t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
